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THE "GIANT SUCKING SOUND" REVISITED: A BLUEPRINT TO PREVENT
POLLUTION HAVENS BY EXTENDING NAFTA's UNHERALDED
"Eco-DUMPING" PROVISIONS TO THE NEW WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE "POLLUTION HAVEN" CRISIS
Ursula Garza de Garza has no problem keeping her dogs clean of fleas.
She simply dunks them in the murky canal that flows by her house and the
fleas are gone. "All the hair falls off, too," she laments. "But gradually it
comes back on."' Garza lives in Matamoros, Mexico, a few bleak miles
from the Texas border. Matamoros is home to ninety-five maquiladoras:2
factories that import raw materials duty-free into Mexico, use cheap Mexican
labor for assembly, and export the goods subject only to a low value-added
tax.3 As trade barriers continue to crumble between the United States and
Mexico, increasing numbers of U.S. companies are establishing factories in
Mexico.4
One memorable moment from the 1992 Presidential campaign was
candidate Ross Perot's dire warning of the "giant sucking sound" of jobs
leaving the United States for Mexico if the North American Free Trade
Agreement were implemented.5 Perot lost, and NAFTA was ratified by
' Jeannie Ralston, Among the Ruins of Matamoros, AUDUBON, Nov. 1993, at 86.
2 The term "maquiladora" stems from the Spanish word "maquila", which refers to the
amount of corn paid by a farmer as a fee to the miller for the grinding of corn. Elizabeth C.
Rose, Transboundary Harm: Hazardous Waste Problems and Mexico's Maquiladoras, 23
INT'L LAW 223 (1989). In its modem usage, the word "maquila" refers to the labor provided
by a worker, and the word "maquiladora" refers to the factory itself. Id.
' "Value added" refers to the portion of the industrial product that was enhanced by
Mexican resources. This extremely modest tax considers use of local labor, rent, utilities, and
raw materials. ELLWYN R. STODDARD, MAQUILA: ASSEMBLY PLANTS IN NORTHERN MEXICO
74 (1987). See also BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, How TO USE MEXICO'S IN-
BOND INDUSTRY 1 (1986) [hereinafter BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION]; Cheryl
Schechter & David Brill, Jr., Maquiladoras: Will the Program Continue?, 23 ST. MARY'S
LJ. 697 (1992).
4 STODDARD, supra note 3, at 74.
' Ross Perot, 1992 Presidential Debate #3, East Lansing, Michigan (October 19, 1992).
Perot suggested, "You implement NAFTA, the Mexican trade agreement, where they pay
people a dollar an hour, have no health care, no retirement, no pollution controls, et cetera,
et cetera, et cetera, and you're going to hear a giant sucking sound of jobs being pulled out
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Congress on November 20, 1993.6 So far, there has been no detectable loss
of American jobs to Mexican-based industry.7 But there has been a "giant
sucking sound" of another sort, as air and water quality along the U.S.-
Mexico border continue to be degraded by American maquiladorass
By failing to enforce strong environmental standards for U.S. industry
south of the border, Mexico has, for a decade, been making itself a
"pollution haven" to attract industrial development. This is accomplished by
internalizing environmental costs to artificially lower the price of maquila-
dora-made products.9 These costs are internalized in innumerable ways.
Mexican workers bear a disproportionate burden of keeping production costs
low by living in squalor among polluted air and water. Further, the low
production costs are absorbed by the environment itself-not only in Mexico,
but also in the United States, wherever wind and water flow northward
across the border.1 °
Fortunately, NAFTA allows its members to protect against this very
of this country right at a time when we need the tax base to pay the debt and pay down the
interest on the debt and get our house back in order." Id.
6 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States
of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States,
U.S.T. -, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
' Interview with Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Director of the Dean Rusk Center for
International and Comparative Law, in Athens, Georgia (Aug. 22 and Sept. 9, 1994). But see
C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT 28 (1994) (discussing likelihood
of short-term job losses accompanying trade liberalization).
' David Voigt, The Maquiladora Problem in the Age of NAFTA: Where Will We Find
Solutions? 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 323 (1993). These conditions include considerable air
pollution, contaminated groundwater, and illegal toxic discharges. Craig Kovarik, NAFTA and
Environmental Conditions on the United States-Mexico Border, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
61 (1993). The American Medical Association has sounded the alarm over health risks in the
region, referring to the border area as "a virtual cesspool and breeding ground for infectious
disease." Jonathan Marshall, How Ecology is Tied to Mexico Trade Pact, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
25, 1992, at A8 (quoting a report by American Medical Association).
' See Brenda S. Hustis, The Environmental Implications of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 589 (1993) (analyzing danger of Mexico creating such
a "pollution haven" to spur growth).
10 For example, almost half of the sewage generated in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico flows
untreated into the Rio Grande, which supplies much of the drinking water for south Texas.
Three Environmental Agreements Signed By U.S., Mexico During Visit By Salinas, 20 ENVTL.
REP. 1095 (Oct. 20, 1989). In 1992 the Rio Grande was declared the "most dangerous in the
country" by the environmental group American Rivers. Fecal coliform bacteria has been
detected in the river at 33 times the accepted level. Ralston, supra note 1, at 86.
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situation. Under NAFTA, artificial price depression is defined as "dumping"
and is considered a prohibited trade practice." This "eco-dumping" may
be met with a countervailing duty or tariff to deny the producer the benefit
of the unfair subsidy. 2 No nation has ever imposed such an "eco-tariff."' 3
This is because an eco-tariff, while probably legal under NAFTA, 14 is
prohibited under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 5
If the United States tried to pioneer an eco-dumping measure, using NAFTA
as authority, there would certainly be a challenge by other GAIT signatories.
Such a measure, however, is a necessary check on the unsustainable
development that can result from free trade.
On December 1, 1994, the world held its breath as the United States
Senate ratified the controversial Final Act of the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions. The GATT has now been transformed into a "World Trade Organiza-
tion" (WTO) with binding authority to enforce free trade.'6 The members
that will hold the balance of power in the new WTO view U.S. imposition
of environmental trade measures as an affront to their sovereignty. 7
Consequently, if the United States ratifies the Uruguay Round without
negotiating the incorporation of environmental restraints on trade, then the
world will see the emergence of large numbers of "pollution havens" like the
Mexican border area.'" As the new WTO begins to dissolve trade barriers
"NAFTA, supra note 6, at art. 1902.
n See David M. McPherson, Is the North American Free Trade Agreement Entitled to an
Economically Rational Countervailing Duty Scheme?, 73 B.U. L. REV. 47, 50 (1993).
13 Telephone interview with Justin Ward, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC),
Sept. 16, 1994 [hereinafter Ward Interview].
"' Because no nation has used an eco-tariff, the issue has never been tested in dispute
resolution. Authority for such a measure seems implied, however, by NAFTA chapters 11
and 19, discussed infra note 117.
'" Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Parts 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. GATT is a
multinational agreement between over 121 nations which conduct more than eighty percent
of world trade. See discussion, infra note 129 and accompanying text. See also Kenneth S.
Komoroski, The Failure of Governments to Regulate Industry: A Subsidy Under the GATT?,
10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 189 (1988).
' The WTO is born, GATT FOCUS (GATT/Information and Media Relations Division),
May 1994. The WTO is scheduled to be established on January 1, 1995. The U.S. Congress
has not yet voted on ratification of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. Id.
17 See Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable
Development: A Commentary, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728 (1992).
's See Erik Coulter Luchs, Maximizing Wealth With Unilaterally Imposed Environmental
Trade Sanctions Under the GA7T and the NAFTA, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 727 (1994).
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throughout the world, a blueprint must be formulated to allow the imposition
of countervailing duties to prevent eco-dumping.
A. The Border Industrialization Program (BIP)
The Mexican dictator Porfirio Diaz once lamented, "Poor Mexico, so far
from God and so close to the United States." 9  No two neighboring
countries have a greater economic disparity than Mexico and the United
States.20 Yet the economic fortunes of the two nations have always been
linked. 2' The great westward expansion of the United States began when
Mexico ceded California after its 1848 defeat in the Mexican War.'
Mexicans have freely crossed the border for many generations, legally and
illegally, in search of work.' During World War II, the United States
opened the border to migrant workers, filling the void left by American farm
workers drafted to fight in Europe.' This bracero program created work
for over four million Mexican workers until it was abruptly terminated by
the United States in December 1964.'
19 ROSE, supra note 3.
' Khosrow Fatemi, Introduction, in THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY: ECONOMIC
SOLUTION OR PROBLEM? 7 (Khosrow Fatemi ed., 1990).
21 Id.
2 THE CONCISE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 128 (Judith S. Levy & Agnes Greenhall eds.,
1983). Gold was discovered in California at Sutter's Mill during the same year, spurring
thousands of settlers to move to the new territory, which became the 31st state in 1850. Id.
23 LESLIE SKLAIR, ASSEMBLING FOR DEvELOPMENT: THE MAQUILA INDUSTRY IN MEXICO
AND THE UNITED STATES 28 (1989). The border stretches almost 2,000 miles from the Gulf
of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean. Over 200 million people cross the U.S.-Mexico border
annually, making it the most heavily traveled border in the world. Phillip D. Hardberger,
Industrialization in the Borderlands and the NAFTA Treaty, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 699 (1993).
2 Throughout the century, and continuing today, the American economy has relied on
unskilled, low-wage Mexican workers to solve labor shortages, particularly in western states.
Judith Ann Warner, The Sociological Impact of the Maquiladoras, in FATEMI, supra note 20,
at 183. These Mexicans replaced "Okie" workers from Oklahoma, Arkansas, and other
Southern states who traveled west looking for agricultural jobs after they were driven off their
lands during the Great Depression. Bob Secter & Ronald B. Taylor, New Wave of Cheap
Labor Seen; Alien Farm Workers Fear Immigration Law Change, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1985,
at Al.
' The program employed a few thousand workers in the early 1940s, swelling to around
400,000 workers annually by 1964. By then, there were more workers attempting to cross
the border than jobs available, and large numbers of illegal aliens began to supplement the
bracero workers. The bracero migrants were treated practically as slave labor by employers,
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Overnight, unemployment plagued large border towns that had grown at
an unprecedented rate to service the bracero program. Oil exports, which
had been the largest industry in Mexico since the 1930s, began a slow
decline continuing to this day.26 Drastic action was needed to put the
bracero workers in northern Mexico back to work.27 The maquiladora
and the squalor of their condition forced the United States to cancel the program. Warner,
supra note 24, at 183. There are conflicting opinions whether maquiladora workers are
treated any better. When director Michael Moore, host of TV Nation, visited Mexico
(ostensibly to decide whether to relocate his show to take advantage of NAFTA), he got the
foreman of a Whirlpool factory to admit that his workers earned 75 cents an hour and could
not afford to buy the washing machines they made. Moore rattled the American by asking
him, "How would you say in Spanish, 'As soon as you get your arm out of that machine,
you're fired?' " TV Nation (NBC television broadcast, July 19, 1994). The pro-industry
BusnnEss INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, however, notes that American factories pay
relatively generous fringe benefits to combat high worker turnover rates. BUSINESS
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 3, at 33.
26 STODDARD, supra note 3, at 2. For a half century, Mexico's vast, nationalized
petroleum reserves seemed to be the one domestic resource that the nation could always count
on. In 1938, President L.Azaro Clrdenas confiscated the Republic's rich oilfields from foreign
companies and nationalized the petroleum industry. Id, For decades, oil provided a steady
stream of revenue that reduced trade deficits and was distributed throughout the nation in the
form of generous subsidies on food and public services. Since that time, there has been a
slow but steady decline in Mexico's oil reserves. This decline was sharply but ephemerally
reversed in 1973, when the OPEC oil embargo created havoc around the world. Id Most
Americans remember gas lines around the block as oil prices increased 400 percent around
the world. See Paul W. Valentine & Art Harris, Easy Tankful Becoming Harder to Find,
WASH. POST, June 15, 1979, at Al; Isabelle Clary, UPI, Aug. 17, 1990, available in LEXIS,
News Library, ARCNWS File. In the mid-1970s Mexico suddenly claimed to have
discovered vast new oilfields as large as those in Saudi Arabia. Although these reports were
wildly inflated, the country was flush with capital for about five years. See Fatemi, supra
note 20, at 8, 9. In 1982, the bottom fell out of the oil boom. Re-estimation of Mexico's
actual oil reserves revealed the inaccuracy of the earlier reports. Then, with the end of the
OPEC embargo, oil prices collapsed from $30 per barrel to under $15. Mexico's nationalized
oil company, PEMEX, was forced to reduce its work force by 40,000 jobs, and the industry
has been slowly denationalized. STODDARD, supra note 3, at 2. Still, Mexico is ranked sixth
in the world in production of petroleum and derivative products, and is ranked eighth in
hydrocarbon reserves. Terzah N. Lewis, Environmental Law in Mexico, 21 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 159 (1992).
" Almost fifty percent of Mexico's workers are either unemployed or grossly underem-
ployed. Ironically, Mexico's insistent drive towards becoming a modem industrialized nation
is contributing to this crisis. For example, as Mexico streamlined its inefficient banking
system over the past decade, 17,000 bank employees have been thrown out of work.
STODDARD, supra note 3, at 73.
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program was the result. This centerpiece of the Border Industrialization
Program (BIP) of 1965 has turned Mexico towards a strategy of export-
focused industrialization fueled by foreign investment and technology.28
Mexico has a long history of lowering trade barriers to encourage economic
growth.29 The BIP program, however, institutionalized free trade on an
unprecedented scale. 0 It signified a realization by protectionist Mexico that
the economic giant to the north-long seen as a threat-could also be used
to induce economic opportunity.31 Foreign investors were encouraged to
Santos Gomez, Environmental Risks Related to the Maquiladora Industry and the Likely
Environmental Impact of NAFTA, 6 LA RAZA LJ. 174 (1993). The "border area" is defined
by mutual agreement to constitute a zone 100 kilometers (62 miles) on each side of the U.S.-
Mexico border. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the United
Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in
the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., art. 1, reprinted in 19 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc.
1137 (1983). The BIP was created when an official in the administration of then-President
Dfaz Ordaz toured newly industrializing countries in Asia during the early 1960s and became
aware of U.S. corporations building assembly plants there, taking advantage of cheap labor.
Within a year, Mexico announced the BIP. PATRICIA A. WILSON, EXPORTS AND LOCAL
DEvELOPMENT: MEXICO'S NEW MAQUTLADORAs 36 (1992).
" Mexico's first zona libre (border free trade zone) was established in 1861 to stem a
flood of emigration to prosperous Texas. During the American Civil War, the Confederate
army took advantage of this policy to smuggle supplies into the United States after the Union
cut off trade with the South. STODDARD, supra note 3, at 16. Between 1933 and 1939 the
Mexican government attempted to nurture economic development in the border zone by
declaring zonas libre in Tijuana and Ensenada, then in Baja California and part of Sonora.
The protectionist leaders of the Republic hoped to encourage the flow of products from the
central part of the country. Predictably, the program instead further opened the door to U.S.
markets and only contributed to Mexico's trade imbalance with its neighbor. SKLAIR, supra
note 20, at 28. Some observers disagree, suggesting that this program was representative of
a dual policy: a strict protectionist program for the national economy, but an open border for
a strictly defined zone in the North, cultivating interdependency with the United States. See
STODDARD, supra note 3, at 16.
o The BIP program had three objectives: (1) to speed the process of industrialization in
the border region; (2) to attract foreign industry to create a market for Mexican parts and
materials; and (3) to fight unemployment in the border towns after the cancellation of the
bracero program. STODDARD, supra note 3, at 17.
' President Dfaz Ordaz signaled this change in 1965, declaring, "Let us make our country
economically free so that it may be politically free." Quoted in ANTONIO J. BERM(DEZ,
RECOVERING OUR FRONTIER MARKET: A TASK IN THE SERVICE OF MEXICO 142 (Edward
Fowlkes trans., 1968). Mexico's economy is centered around vast Mexico City, far to the
south of the U.S. border. A major challenge of the BIP program was to force Mexican elite
industrialists to "wake up to the fact that there were substantial profits to be made along the
border, but that it was the U.S. and not the Mexican business community that was reaping
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establish factories along the border. Attracted by cheap wages and the
generous duty-free zone, twelve maquiladora factories, employing 3,000
people, were established in 1966.32
B. Maquiladora Growth Since 1982
The great increase in maquiladora growth came after 1982, when Mexico
suffered a sudden and deep recession.33 One million people lost their jobs
that year, and the country sank $83 billion into debt.' While the economy
reeled in all other respects, the single bright spot in the economy was the
maquiladora program, which grew 2.6 percent in 1982."5 The government
turned to the eighteen-year old program, hoping to make it the centerpiece
of an economic recovery. s On August 14, 1983, Mexican President
Miguel de la Madrid arranged a highly public meeting with President Ronald
Reagan to announce Mexico's renewed commitment to border industrializa-
tion."' The next day, de la Madrid released his Presidential Decree for
Development and Operation of the In-Bond Assembly Industry Program.8
The decree relaxed restrictions on maquiladora plants designed to encourage
them." SKLAIR, supra note 20, at 29.
32 BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 3, at 1. The average daily wage
among border region industrial workers in 1964 was 24.4 pesos, or $1.95 per day. By 1988,
the guaranteed minimum wage was 8,000 pesos, or $8.00 per day. SKLAIR, supra note 20,
at 37-39.
3 This recession was caused when world oil prices fell, snuffing out the wild economic
growth sparked by Mexico's petroleum exports during the 1970s. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text. Mexico's economy grew about six percent per year between 1950 and
1980, but experienced negative growth from 1982 (with the collapse of the oil industry)
through 1987. Kovarik, supra note 8, at 61.
34 Richard J. Meislin, Mexican Economy: Wary Hope Amid Gloom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
23, 1983, at Al.
31 SKLAIR, supra note 20, at 68. Admittedly, this year marked the weakest growth in the
history of the BIP. In the preceding few years of the program, 1978-1980, the number of
plants had grown 16.5%. FATEMI, supra note 20, at 4.
36 See generally WILSON, supra note 28 (presenting wealth of tabular data on composition
of the maquiladora industry).
3' Meeting with President de la Madrid of Mexico, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1135
(Aug. 14, 1983). President Reagan noted after the meeting, "We have a 2,000 mile common
border. I prefer not to look on it as a border, but instead as a meeting place.... We agree
that the Maquiladora... program make[s] a contribution to the economies of both our nations
by increasing jobs and promoting economic activity, especially at the border." Id.
38 BusINEss INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 3, at 3.
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their growth. 9 Along with the decree, de la Madrid drastically devalued
the peso, resulting in a great decline in Mexican wages in dollar terms.'
Suddenly, Mexican wages were competitive with high-growth Asian markets
like Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Korea.41 The policy succeeded wildly at
encouraging U.S. companies to build factories in Mexico rather than Pacific
Rim countries. At the end of 1993, there were 2,195 maquiladoras
employing one-half million workers.42
C. Environmental Conditions in the Border Area
American folk history mythologizes the rugged beauty of the Southwest.
Louis L'Amour described a visit to a typical border town in this way:
[F]rom the crest of a ridge he could see far and away the
smoke of a train. The air was very clear and fresh, and he
breathed deeply. Off to the north he could see two mesas
lifting their square rock shoulders against the sky.... It
was a lovely country, and too bad he had so little time left
to enjoy it.43
3 Id. For the first time, the maquiladoras were allowed to sell a percentage (up to 20%)
of their products within the Mexican market. Ken Flynn, Mexican Industrialists Happy Over
Twin-Plant Ruling, UPI, Sept. 6, 1983, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
Further, de la Madrid agreed to encourage placement of new factories within the interior of
the country, a legal, but discouraged, practice since 1971. BusI EsS INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION, supra note 3, at 13. Both actions made a maquiladora operation increasingly
attractive to U.S. investors.
"o The peso traded at 26 to the U.S. dollar in January 1982, and plunged to 150 to the
dollar by August 1983. Meislin, supra note 34, at Al.
"' Marc N. Scheinman, Maquiladoras in the Automobile Industry, in FATEMI, supra note
20, at 122. See also M. Angeles Villarreal, Mexico's Maquiladora Industry, MEXICO TRADE
& L. REP. (Apr. 1, 1992), available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
42 Maquiladora Sector Statistics, 1993, SourceMex Economic News & Analysis on
Mexico, Mar. 30, 1994, available in WESTLAW, PTS-NEWS database. The number of
plants has soared geometrically, even before de la Madrid made maquiladora growth a
priority in 1983. In 1970, there were 160 plants, with 20,327 workers. SKLAIR, supra note
23, at 54. In 1975, there were 454 plants, with 67,214 workers. I, at 63. In 1980, there
were 620 plants, with 119,546 workers. Id. at 68. In 1985, there were 760 plants, with
211,968 workers. Id
43 LOUIS L'AMOUR, FLINT 29 (1960).
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In 1994, a visit to a border town is not recounted using such pastoral words.
A reporter visiting Nogales, Mexico, this year described it in this way:
The huge municipal dump used by the maquilas is a
Dickensian nightmare. Squatters sift through pools of
greenish slime looking for copper wire that they can sell.
Pigs, who will later be eaten, forage through mounds of
garbage. And the dump, filled with rubber and plastic,
regularly catches fire and sends noxious plumes of white
smoke hundreds of feet into the air."
There are recent signs that the Mexican government is taking environmen-
tal protection seriously.45 This largely began due to fear that the environ-
mental issue would derail U.S. approval of NAFTA, a prospect Mexico
desperately wanted to avoid.' Consequently, in the past two years, former
President Carlos Salinas reduced lead content of petroleum (a step taken by
the United States in 1973),' 7 forced the closure of over one hundred oil
refineries and other installations, and ordered some power generators to
replace smog-causing fuel oil with clean natural gas.4" The Secretariat of
Social Development (SEDESOL), the Mexican ministry of ecology, recently
announced a $263 million urban renewal plan that would include funding for
" Diego Ribadeneira, On Mexico's Border, 'Prosperity' Has an Ugly Side, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 12, 1994, at 10.
41 See Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North
American Free Trade Agreement, in THE MEXICO-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 13-56 (Peter
M. Garber ed., 1993). Grossman and Krueger conclude that "a more liberal trade regime and
greater access to the U.S. market is likely to generate income growth in Mexico." Id. at 47.
They present data suggesting that economic growth works to reduce pollution problems when
per capita income reaches about $4,000 to $5,000. Id. at 47-48. Mexican per capita income
has now reached $5,000, which suggests that any further economic growth generated by
NAFTA will create Mexican consumer demand for stronger enforcement of environmental
laws. Id.
46 See generally WILLIAM A. ORME, JR., CONTINENTAL SHIFr: FREE TRADE & THE NEw
NORTH AMERICA (1993) (analyzing the political atmosphere that led to creation of NAFTA).
47 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(0 (1973) (amended 1990).
" See Mexico: Smog City, ECONOMIST, May 18, 1991, at 50; Increase in Cross-Border
Commerce, Waste Only Certainty for NAFTA, Officials Agree, 23 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1317
(Sept. 4, 1992) [hereinafter Cross-Border Commerce].
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sewage treatment plants in the border area. In 1988, Mexico passed a
"General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection""
that addresses air and water pollution, hazardous waste, toxins, pesticides,
and resource conservation." Mexico has multiplied its budget for environ-
mental protection tenfold since 1989,52 and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is cooperating with Mexico to train SEDESOL
personnel to address problems related to air pollution, pesticides, and
hazardous wastes.53 In 1991, former EPA Administrator William K. Reilly
released an Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexico-U.S. Border Area,
establishing a tough enforcement program against illegal exporting of
hazardous waste.' Reilly subsequently insisted that the United States and
Mexico "are determined to move aggressively against polluters in order to
improve public health and the environment along both sides of the bor-
der."55 In the first prosecution under the Integrated Environmental Plan, on
June 3, 1992, the EPA announced seventeen "enforcement actions"-seeking
over $2 million in penalties-on maquiladoras that violated U.S. laws
regulating cross-boundary shipments of hazardous wastes and toxic
substances.5 6 The same day, Mexico announced punitive measures against
49 Mexican Environment Unit to Spend $263 Million on Sewage, Other Projects, 16 INT'L
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 623 (Aug. 25, 1993).
o Ley General de Equilibrio Ecologico y de Proteccidn al Ambiente, 412 DIAJUo OFICIAL
(Jan. 28, 1988).
5' Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): Good
for Jobs, for the Environment, and for America, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 461, 491 (1993).
52 Id.
53 Water Pollution Called Biggest Problem in Region of United States/Mexico Border, 24
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1080 (Oct. 8, 1993). Buck J. Wynne, EPA Region VI Administrator
during the Bush administration, has likened Mexican environmental protection to the state of
U.S. environmental enforcement at the founding of the EPA. He suggested, "Whether we
have a North American Free Trade Agreement or not, there are serious environmental
problems along the border that people living on both sides will demand to be cleaned up."
Id.
54 Reilly Unveils Draft Cooperative Plan to Control Pollution Along U.S.-Mexico Border,
22 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1026 (Aug. 9, 1991).
"' Barrage of Actions Filed by EPA, Mexico Focusing on Law Violations in Border Areas,
23 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 599 (June 5, 1992).
5 id.
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thirty-four maquiladoras for infractions of Mexican law.57
There are unfortunate signs that some of this "enforcement" has been
merely cosmetic. A 1992 Congressional investigation surveyed several
maquiladora plants at random, and discovered that none of them complied
with Mexico's tough 1988 environmental law.5" Further, only five percent
of the factories met the licensing requirement that they return hazardous
wastes to the United States for disposal.5 SEDESOL's $263 million urban
renewal project seems impressive until one measures the need: a joint
Mexico-U.S. business committee estimates that $6.5 billion is needed merely
to reach internationally acceptable standards for water, sewage, and
hazardous and solid waste disposal within the next decade.' The dozens
of prosecutions trumpeted by Mexican authorities only mask the hundreds
or thousands of violations suggested by the 1992 Congressional study.
Unlike U.S. residents, private citizens in Mexico are virtually precluded from
bringing a "toxic tort" or "citizen suit" to demand enforcement of environ-
mental laws.61 Furthermore, maquiladora pollution tends to be worse than
" Id. The U.S. enforcement team discovered infractions of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA), and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRTKA). In
Mexico, safety violations caused the temporary closing of eight factories. In addition, four
plants forfeited surety bonds, and twenty-two received general citations. Id.
m General Accounting Office, U.S.-Mexico Trade: Assessment of Mexico's Environmental
Controls for New Companies, GAO/GGD-92-113 (Aug. 3, 1992). The report was
commissioned by Senator Ernest Hollings (D.-SC), chairman of the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation committee. Hollings charges that American companies are failing
to comply with Mexican environmental laws: "In the past several years, I have witnessed the
exodus of American companies to Mexico in search of low wages and a lax regulatory
environment. The GAO report confirms my worst fears about Mexico's environmental
enforcement." Six U.S.-Owned Maquiladoras Did Not Comply With Mexican Environmental
Laws, GAO Reports, 23 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1206 (Aug. 14, 1992). Mexico has vigorously
disputed this accusation. The government admits that only six percent of maquiladoras met
their license requirements for pollution in 1989, but insisted in 1993 that "estimated
compliance" was now at 75 percent. NAFTA Embodies Regulatory Conflict Between
Environment, Trade, Official Says, 24 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 16 (May 7, 1993).
" General Accounting Office, supra note 58.
60 U.S. Council of the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee, Report, July 14, 1993 (on file
with author). See also Local, Private Sector Help Needed for Environmental Projects,
Browner Says, 24 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 528 (July 23, 1993).
61 Greg M. Block, One Step Away From Environmental Citizen Suits in Mexico, 23
ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10347 (June 1993). Block describes how SEDESOL "denies
environmental interests meaningful access to the process... [reducing] the public to a virtual
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that of U.S. industrial sites contaminated by wrongful disposal of hazardous
wastes. No site in the United States compares to Ojo de Agua, east of
Tijuana, where a fire at the battery factory owned by American company
Alco Pacific burned for months underneath 700,000 cubic feet of batteries,
trash, lead, sulfuric acid, and dirt, too powerful to be extinguished by
firefighters.62 There can be no doubt that the environmental cost of
"business as usual" in the Mexican border area is intolerably high.
I. LEGALrrY OF EcO-PROTECTIONIST MEASURES
A. NAFTA and the Environmental Side Agreement
The basis of NAFIA is straightforward: within ten years, almost all
restrictions on manufacturing trade between the United States, Canada, and
Mexico will disappear.63 True free trade will exist within fifteen years,
when any remaining tariffs and quotas on agricultural products are scheduled
to end." While Canada and the United States already have a practically
open border, NAFTA is significant because it forces Mexico to abandon a
legacy of protectionism and economic nationalism.'
Malissa Hathaway McKeith, a Los Angeles attorney who represents
several maquiladoras, suggests, "There really aren't any provisions in
NAFTA that impact the day-to-day operations of U.S. businesses from an
spectator." Id.
6 Fernando Romero, Mexico Orders Owner to Remove Battery Waste, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Jan. 31, 1992, at B3.
63 See generally ROBERT HowE, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: SELECTED
ANNOTATED REFERENCES, 1989-1992 (1992) (presenting an excellent bibliography on recent
NAFTA commentary).
6Hustis, supra note 9.
See ORME, supra note 46, at 5. Orme suggests that Canada is
ultimately a bystander to the North-South rapprochement that Nafta
represents .... Americans didn't need to overcome ethnocentrism or fears
of dollar-an-hour labor to sign a trade pact with Canada. A few
provisions of the U.S.-Canadian agreement would be simplified by Nafta;
others would be liberalized further. Overall, however, the status of U.S.-
Canadian commerce-already largely free, and representing fully a fifth
of American global trade--would be little altered.
Id. See also THE MEXICO-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 45.
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environmental perspective."'  Still, NAFTA won support from environmen-
talists because the Clinton administration grafted on broad, general
provisions for environmental protection.67  NAFTA's environmental
provisions can be placed into eight categories. The first six "green"
categories are straightforward and, although important, are unexceptional as
they serve principally to preserve the viability of the U.S. environmental
regime: (1) "philosophical" provisions in the preamble;" (2) standards-
related measures;69 (3) sanitary and phytosanitary measures;70 (4) dispute
resolution/forum selection procedures;71 (5) preservation of existing
international environmental agreements despite NAFTA's general pre-
emption power;72 and (6) the environmental "side agreement 73 negotiated
prior to signing of the NAFTA document.74
Two further NAFTA chapters, though, are exceptional-even more so than
the tepid environmental side agreement. Although little-heralded, these two
chapters present the most powerful tool that the U.S. has to maintain
environmental quality both domestically and abroad. Chapter 11 ("Invest-
ment") contains language designed to prevent nations from using investment
practices to attract industry through eco-dumping." The investment chapter
is given muscle by Chapter 19 ("Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
66 Cross-Border Commerce, supra note 48, at 1317. See also Michael Scott Feeley &
Elizabeth Knier, Environmental Considerations of the Emerging United States-Mexico Free
Trade Agreement, 2 DUKE J. COmp. & INT'L L. 259 (1992). Feeley and Knier quote writer
Carlos Fuentes, who spoke at the 1983 Harvard commencement on the difficulty of enforcing
U.S. standards in the developing Mexican economy. Fuentes suggested that "the clocks of
all men and women, of all civilizations, are not set at the same hour." Id
67 Ward interview, supra note 13. This support has not been universal. The environmen-
tal groups Public Citizen, Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth sued the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) in 1993 to force the USTR to prepare an environmental impact
statement before the treaty was submitted for ratification by Congress. Public Citizen v.
United States Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
6" See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
0 See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
7' See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
73 See infra notes 109-116 and accompanying text.
'4 See Raymond Ludwiszewski, "Green" Language in the NAFTA: Reconciling Free
Trade and Environmental Protection, 27 INT'L LAw. 691 (1993), available in Westlaw, JR
Directory.
7 NAFTA, supra note 6.
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Matters"), a safeguard against more traditional and straightforward trade
subsidies. While not explicitly an environmental provision, a side-by-side
reading of the antidumping chapter with the sustainable investment chapter
suggests that eco-dumping can be combatted with countervailing tariffs under
NAFTA.
1. "Green" Provision #1: The NAFTA Preamble
The NAFTA Preamble insists that trade development must only occur "in
a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation. ' 76 It
further advocates "sustainable development," 77 an ethic that economic
development must look to long-term survival and not merely short-term
profits.7' The preamble then proposes "strengthen[ing] the development
and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations"'7 in the three
nations. Three of the fifteen general goals of the NAFTA preamble are
environmental; a fourth goal promises to "improve working conditions and
living standards,"' a necessary part of sustainable development.
76 Id., preamble.
n Id.
's "Sustainable development" is most notably expounded upon in HERMAN E. DALY &
JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD (1989). Daly is a former senior economist at
the World Bank, and Cobb is a theologian. They argue that conventional economics has
"transformed the character of the planet" to the brink of ecological ruin. Id. at 3. Traditional
economic theory, Daly and Cobb believe, suffers from "the fallacy of misplaced concrete-
ness," by depending on a "scientific" model of behavior (economics) which underestimates
the irrationality and self-destructive behavior of human actors. Id. at 35. See also DAVID W.
ORR, ECOLOGICAL LITERACY (1992). Orr suggests that there are really two versions of
sustainability: "technological" and "ecological". The former is short-term, describing
evolutionary changes to promote human survival. "Ecological sustainability," however,
reflects a revolutionary shift, repudiating "individualism, anthropocentrism, patriarchy,
mechanization, economism, consumerism, nationalism, and militarism," to be replaced by a
post-modem survival ethic of environmental sanity. I&
79 NAFTA, supra note 6, preamble.
s Id.
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2. "Green" Provision #2: Environmental Standards
The chapter on standards-related measures"1 is considered by many
observers to be the "centerpiece of the 'green language' in NAFTA."s2 The
section addresses concerns that a free trade agreement will allow other
nations to challenge U.S. environmental provisions as unfair trade barriers.
This was undoubtedly spurred by a recent successful challenge of U.S.
environmental laws under GATr, the 'Tuna/Dolphin dispute. 83 In May
1993, a GATT dispute settlement panel ruled that a U.S. boycott under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act" of Mexican tuna caught using methods
that killed dolphins was inconsistent with GATT.' NAFTA Article 906(2)
requires the signatories to "make compatible" their environmental laws. This
cooerced cooperation on environmental protection is commonly referred to
as "harmonizing." To this end, NAFTA mandates creation of a tri-lateral
Committee on Standards-Related Measures to follow up on the development
and enforcement of harmonized measures." However, NAFTA explicitly
prohibits downward harmonization, as represented by the tuna/dolphin
decision. The obligation to harmonize standards is limited to the extent that
harmonization will not "reduc[e] the level of safety or of protection of
s' Id. at chapter 9.
Ludwiszewski, supra note 74.
8 GATT: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna Panel Report.] See also RUNGE, supra note
7, at 71-73.
" Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1371 (1972). For
two decades, the MMPA required a boycott of yellowfin tuna caught by any country whose
average catch of dolphins in tuna nets exceeded an agreed-upon limit for that year. Tuna
Panel Report, supra note 83. Although Mexico won its trade suit against the United States,
Mexico chose to settle the matter, and the GATT ruling body never adopted the report.
RUNGE, supra note 7, at 74. It must be noted that in mid-1993 Mexico was lobbying for
American passage of NAFTA. Surely Mexico only backed off on their tuna victory in order
to salvage NAFTA (which, hunted by Ross Perot, was even more endangered in 1993 than
the dolphins were).
5 Tuna Panel Report, supra note 83. In response to the ruling, Public Citizen's Lori
Wallach commented, "It was helpful for GAIT to reveal its hand again and make vividly
clear what is in store for U.S. environmental and consumer laws .... Many laws will be
found GAIT-illegal and then Congress must either eliminate the laws or face perpetual trade
sanctions." Nancy Dunne, US Test for a 'Dead Fish' Theory--Uruguay Round Ratification
Brings Congress Another 'Crisis', FIN. TIMES, May 25, 1994, at 7.
86 NAFTA, supra note 6, at ch. 9.
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human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers."'
This provision alone could have a powerful and positive impact on the
environment. As a "one-way ratchet,"' it drives environmental standards
of all three countries upward. The chapter expressly protects the right of
each country to enforce greater environmental protection than the harmonized
standards if it desires. NAFTA guarantees this by protecting each party's
right to ban imports that are below domestic standards. This has caused
tension. For example, U.S. health rules prohibit importation of Mexican
milk (which is not date-stamped for freshness), while U.S. milk is freely
exportable to Mexico. A "milk war" has erupted in border towns, where
drivers delivering milk from El Paso to Juarez have been beaten and their
trucks burned. 9 Mexican dairy farmers allege that U.S. concern over food
safety is merely a front for protectionist policies to protect domestic
producers.' This is an inevitable result of a free trade pact, suggests
Jeffrey E. Garten, the Clinton administration's Undersecretary of Commerce
for International Trade: "The history is that as tariffs are reduced, nontariff
barriers are raised to substitute. Then nontariff barriers are reduced. But it
takes a long time." 91 As a means of addressing this issue, NAFTA requires
that standards more stringent than harmonized levels must further "legitimate
objectives" 92 such as safety, health, and protection of the environment.
Such tensions must be ironed out, but inclusion of this provision is an
essential, and unprecedented, hallmark of a sustainable trade relationship.
3. "Green" Provision #3: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures93
NAFTA permits each nation to protect human, animal, or plant life at a
discretionary level within its territory.' Like the chapter on standards,
above, this chapter permits a party to set a higher level of protection than
97 Id. at art. 906(2).
88 Ludwiszewski, supra note 74.
89 Allen R. Myerson, New Limits Are Seen to Freer Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1994,
at D1.
9 Id.
9' Id. at D4.
92 NAFTA, supra note 6, at arts. 904, 905.93 
"Sanitary", in this context, means "occupied with measures or equipment for improving
conditions that influence health." WEBSTER'S 3D NEw INT'L DICr. 2012 (1981).
"Phytosanitary" refers to measures taken to sustain plant life. Ild. at 1708.
94 NAFTA, supra note 6, at ch. 7.
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other parties, although allowing a narrower basis for differentiation: each
party agrees to base its sanitary and phytosanitary measures on scientific
principles and risk assessment to avoid allowing these measures to become
disguised protectionist measures.95 Each of these two provisions differs
from the GATT, which prevents governments from using environmental
regulations for protectionist purposes by practically forbidding their
interference with trade altogether."
Most importantly, NAFTA places the burden of proof for a challenge to
a sanitary or phytosanitary standard on the challenging party.' This
presumption that health and safety-based standards are valid is an important
factor in rating NAFTA to be a "green" document.
4. "Green" Provision #4: Dispute Settlement Procedures
NAFTA's dispute settlement procedure recognizes the sensitivity of
environmental concerns in trade by creating a strong presumption in favor
of the legitimacy of an environmental measure challenged under authority of
NAFTA.98 The rage sparked by the GATT Tuna/Dolphin decision guaran-
teed that negotiations over the dispute-resolution procedures in NAFTA
would be eco-friendly. Under NAFTA, all complaints regarding protectionist
measures must be submitted to a dispute settlement commission. The
commission is required to consider environmental concerns in deciding
whether a disputed protectionist measure violates NAFTA responsibilities."
The dispute resolution commission is also required to consult scientific
experts in deciding complex environmental issues."° NAFTA requires the
commission to use the scientific findings in its deliberative process and to
make the report available to the public."' Incredible as it seems, this is
the first time a trade agreement has created such a formal mechanism
whereby trade mediators are provided the resources to make fully informed
95 Id. at art. 723(2). See also Peter M. Emerson & Robert A. Collinge, The Environmen-
tal Side of North American Free Trade, in NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT 45 (Terry L.
Anderson ed., 1993).
9 Emerson & Collinge, supra note 95, at 54.
9' NAFTA, supra note 6, at art. 723 (2).
98 Id. at chapter 20.99 i.
1o Id. at arts. 2014, 2015.
101 NAFTA, supra note 6, at art. 2015.
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decisions." It also presents a sharp contrast to the secretive dispute
resolution procedures of the WTO. °3
5. "Green" Provision #5: Protection of Environmental Agreements
NAFTA pre-empts most international agreements that conflict with it. 04
The sole exception to this rule is found in Article 104(1), which provides
that NAFTA must exist in harmony with certain international environmental
agreements, principally the Convention on the International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES), 0 5 the Montreal Protocol on ozone protec-
tion," 6 and the Basel Convention on hazardous substances." ° All Article
103 actions which impact trade, however, must conflict with NAFTA as little
as possible. When a NAFTA-friendly option for eco-compliance is "equally
effective and reasonably available,"'" it must be implemented.
6. "Green" Provision #6: The Environmental Side Agreement
The "North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation'"
gives some dull teeth to NAFTA's environmental provisions. This
environmental "side agreement" was drafted by the Clinton Administration
after environmental groups, including the National Wildlife Federation, the
Audubon Society, and the Environmental Defense Fund, threatened to lobby
against NAFTA unless a trilateral commission were created to enforce eco-
cooperation between Canada, the United States, and Mexico, and to ensure
102 Ludwiszewski, supra note 74.
03 See discussion, infra note 137 and accompanying text.
104 NAFTA, supra note 6, at art. 103.
"o Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, as amended June 22, 1979, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
106 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550, amended and adjusted, 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
o Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and
Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657. Raymond Ludwiszewski notes, "It is
noteworthy that the Basel Convention is listed in the NAFTA, but the United States has not
yet formally ratified this international agreement." Ludwiszewski, supra note 74.
'0o NAFTA, supra note 6, at art. 104(1).
" North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Government
of the United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United Mexican States, Sept. 13, 1993, _ U.S.T. __, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1480-1499
[hereinafter Side Agreement].
[Vol. 24:347
"Eco-DuMPIG" PROVISIONS
that environmental standards were not sacrificed to lubricate the flow of
trade."1 ° The side agreement contains positive, if lukewarm, language
affirming the right of each signatory to impose stronger environmental
regulations than its trading partners:
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own
levels of domestic environmental protection and environ-
mental development policies and priorities, and to adopt or
modify accordingly its environmental laws and regulations,
each Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide
for high levels of environmental protection and shall strive
to improve those laws and regulations.'
The requirement that each party establish and enforce "high levels" of
environmental protection is patently flimsy. The side agreement also
contains a provision that any environmental regulation can be overruled by
"bona fide decisions to allocate resources" to other environmental concerns
with "higher priorities."' . This seems to grant a great deal of discretion
to each government to determine appropriate priorities. However, the
NRDC's Justin Ward suggests that "[t]here is nothing to indicate that
[Mexico is] walking away from the side agreement.""' Ward contrasts
this with the "labor side agreement""' 4 negotiated concurrently with the
10 Lynn L. Bergeson, Environmental Side Agreement Has At Least One Big Loophole,
CORP. LE AL TIMEs, Dec. 1993, at 28. During the 1992 Presidential campaign, candidate
Bill Clinton opposed NAFTA in the form it was signed by President Bush, but conceded that
he "would support it if certain conditions were met." Both Sides With Jesse Jackson (CNN
television broadcast, Sept. 4, 1993). After drafting environmental side agreements and
another agreement on labor issues, Clinton argued that
Those conditions have been met as far as our agreements with the
Mexicans.... [W]e're going to have the first trade agreement in history
that's got strong environmental requirements and that has Mexico
committing to raise its minimum wage as its economy grows. So
that-these are very encouraging and very different things.
Id.
... Side Agreement, supra note 109, at art. 3.
1 Id. at art. 45(1)(b).
"3 Ward interview, supra note 13.
14 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Between the Government of the
United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
Mexican States, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1547 (Sept. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Labor Side
1994]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
environmental side agreement, claiming that Mexico has been "foot-
dragging" on implementing those provisions." 5 This hopeful note is a
common theme among environmental observers. Washington environmental
attorney Lynn Bergeson, for example, worries that "the modest gains
represented by the side agreement may not be an adequate quid pro quo for
the potential threat to the environment posed by relaxed trade regulations,"
but nonetheless suggests that the side agreement "plainly makes NAFTA the
'Green'est trade agreement ever.., considered for U.S. ratification."'' 6
B. NAFTA's Unheralded Eco-Dumping Provisions
"Adequate" quid pro quo or not, NAFTA does provide the basis for an
environmentally sound trade regime in North America. Most observers seem
to believe that the chapter on standards-related measures is the centerpiece
of NAFTA's environmental "muscle." ' 7 This is an inherently egocentric
notion because it suggests that free trade's greatest danger is the threat it
poses to U.S. environmental standards. Of far greater concern is the danger
that a developing nation like Mexico will opt to become a giant maquila-
dora, trading the health and environment of its poorest citizens for economic
growth. This danger has a possible remedy in NAFTA Chapters 11 and 19.
1. NAFTA Chapter 11: Environmental Investment
NAFrA's most truly significant environmental provision is contained in
Article 1114(2), which explicitly forbids the creation of such a "pollution
haven" to fuel investment:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environ-
mental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or
otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise
Agreement].
5 Ward interview, supra note 13. These provisions mandate the creation of a trilateral
Commission for Labor Cooperation to monitor the enforcement of labor laws within each
country. Each party must give "due consideration" to a demand by an employer or employee
for an investigation of unfair labor practices. Labor Side Agreement, supra note 114, at arts.
2-3.
116 Bergeson, supra note 110, at 28.
117 See Ludwiszewski, supra note 74.
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derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention in its
territory of an investment of such an investor."1
This chapter formally discourages each government from lowering its own
environmental standards to increase investment. If the provision is taken
seriously, it will ensure that NAFTA's environmental measures will take
precedence over its free trade measures." 9  If good fences truly make
good neighbors, then this provision should keep neighborhood harmony at
a premium, as U.S. industry will have fewer incentives to ship polluting
industries south of the border.
This investment provision seems to promote the "polluter pays principle"
(PPP), which means that
[The polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the
... measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the
environment is in an acceptable state. In other words, the
cost of these measures should be reflected in the cost of
goods and services which cause pollution in production
and/or consumption. 20
The PPP philosophy was formulated by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) as a fundamental tenet of sustainable
production. 12
2. NAFTA Chapter 19: Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
NAFTA allows each party to apply its own antidumping and countervail-
ing duty laws to goods traded among the three nations." ' A countervailing
duty is a tariff that is imposed to eliminate the cost advantage gained by a
subsidy." If NAFTA has serious environmental "muscle," it can be found
18 NAFTA, supra note 6, at art. 1114(2).
"9 Emerson & Collinge, supra note 95, at 55.
' Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Guiding
Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies,
Recommendation a(4), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1172 (1972).
121 Id.
"z NAFTA, supra note 6, at art. 1902(1).
123 See McPherson, supra note 12, at 50.
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in the unsung provisions of Chapter 19. NAFTA Chapters 11 and 19, read
in tandem, suggest that countervailing duties may be levied in response to
eco-dumping. A countervailing eco-tariff would be imposed when a
producer prices its export goods more cheaply than their true production cost
because the environmental costs of production have been internalized by the
corporation, the community, or the nation of production. Internalization of
environmental costs is disastrous not only for the environment of that region,
but for the environment of that nation's trading partners. The targeted
nation's producers are unable to adopt ecologically sound (and expensive)
new technology, and yet stay competitive.' .'
One serious problem exists if Chapter 19 is to be used to justify
imposition of eco-tariffs: the chapter explicitly states that it is pre-empted
by GATT in any contradicting details."z  The GATT Uruguay Round
Agreement prohibits all unilateral actions taken against an unfair trade
practice of another nation."~ This means that eco-tariffs are not currently
permitted and this valuable tool for environmental protection created by
NAFTA has been been eviscerated.
C. Eco-Dumping under the Proposed WTO
1. The History and Structure of the GATT
The current GATTr was intended to be a temporary agreement. It was
devised by U.S. and British diplomats as an adjunct to the Marshall Plan,
which was formulated to rebuild Europe's devastated economies after World
12 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Trade and Environment: An Environmentalist View, reprinted
panel discussion in International Trade and Environmental Policy, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L PROC.
224 (1992).
'2 "Each Party reserves the right to change or modify its antidumping law... provided
that... such amendment... is not inconsistent with... the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade." NAFTA, supra note 6, at art. 1902(1).
12 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, December 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]; Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, arts. 23.1, 23.2
[hereinafter Dispute Understanding].
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War IH.127 The post-war economic system was to be sustained by three
organizations: the World Bank, financing development in developing
countries and rebuilding war-torn Europe; the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), promoting currency stabilization; and an International Trade
Organization (ITO), regulating trade borders. The GATT, nothing more than
an agreement on tariffs and trade, was meant to become a part of the ITO,
but ratification of the ITO was blocked by U.S. Senate conservatives and
was never established.'2 The GATT" has remained, somewhat precarious-
ly, for almost half a century. It is not a treaty. Rather, it is a contract
between its signatories, requiring consensus of all members to make
decisions and to carry them out.'
9
On December 15, 1993, the Trade Negotiations Committee of the GATT
Uruguay Round concluded seven years of debate by adopting the Round's
Final Act by consensus." The Uruguay Round was ratified by the U.S.
Senate on December 1, 1994. The Uruguay Round is a startling departure
from the GAT. It provides for the creation of a World Trade Organization
to monitor and regulate global trade among its signatories.13 1 The WTO
will have a "legal personality" similar to the United Nations and will have
broad powers to ensure compliance with its provisions.
3 2
WTO members must cede a significant portion of their sovereignty over
domestic trade law. The Final Act states, "Each Member shall ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations, and administrative procedures, with its
obligations as provided [by the WTO] agreements.' 33 Consequently, any
U.S. law that does not conform with the WTO could be branded an illegal
restraint on trade. The WTO prohibits all unilateral actions taken against
another nation's unfair trade practice.' 34 If the United States wished to
127 Pat Choate, Director, Manufacturing Policy Project, The World Trade Organization:
What It Means to the United States 1 (undated pamphlet distributed by Public Citizen,
Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Choate pamphlet].
' Id at 2.
129 Steve Charnovitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23
ENVTL. L. 475, 476 (1993).
'30 The WTO is born, supra note 16, at 1.
131 Final Act, supra note 126, at art. in1.
132 Id. at art. VII.
3 Id. at art. XVI(4).
" Specifically, a member nation may "not make a determination to the effect that a
violation has occurred... except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with
the rules and proceedings of this Understanding. .. ." Dispute Understanding, supra note
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protest an environmental subsidy such as creation of a "pollution haven," it
would submit the dispute to the WTO Dispute Settlement Board. 5 A
dispute settlement panel would be appointed of expert judges from non-
disputing nations." WTO courts will be secretive and confidential, far
different from public U.S. courts.1 37 WTO findings will be "uncondition-
ally" binding on the disputing parties; and although there is one appeal of
right on issues of law, all appellate decisions are final unless rejected by all
members of the WTO. 13  Congress would have only two options: change
the offending U.S. law, or pay compensatory trade sanctions.1 39
The serious problem with this provision is that the balance of power in the
WTO is held by developing nations, which are generally hostile to unilateral
environmental trade actions such as eco-tariffs.1" Voting in the WTO is
by "one nation, one vote,""14 not consensus as under the old GATT.
Developing nations will hold eighty-three percent of the votes in the
WTO 42 More than seventy-five percent of WTO members (each a
developing nation) voted against the United States on over half of all votes
taken in the United Nations in 1993.143
126, at art. 23.2.
' Id at art. 1.
136 Id
131 Id. at art. 14.
3ld at art. 17.14.
139 Id. at art. 22.2.
'40 Weiss, supra note 17, at 733.
'' Final Act, supra note 126, at art IX(l). The Final Act makes a weak attempt to pay
homage to the virtues of consensus decision-making, stating,
The [WTO] shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus
followed under the GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a
decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be
decided by voting. At meetings of the ... General Council, each
Member of the [WTO] shall have one vote.
Id. This provision violates common sense. "Consensus" decision-making means that all
parties must be satisfied with a result before action is taken. If a vote may be taken when
consensus cannot be achieved, then every action taken is actually legitimated by majority rule,
which is far different than consensus.
142 Choate pamphlet, supra note 127, at 8.
143 Id.
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2. The Threat Posed by the WTO to Environmental Protection
The WTO is a no-nonsense trade agreement and contains few provisions
for environmental protection. Unlike NAFTA, "the WTO is not a 'green'
treaty."" Consider food safety laws. NAF1TA permits the United States
to continue regulating food.4 The EPA and the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration have virtually unfettered discretion to use scientific data to limit
chemical residues in agricultural products. This will now change. Under the
WTO, harmonized food safety standards will be set by the Codex Alimentar-
ius Commission ("Codex") in Rome, an obscure organization with much
looser pesticide standards than the United States.146 Codex has set health
"tolerances" for 3,285 pesticides, and 1,787 of them allow more pesticide
residue than permitted by the EPA. 47
In April 1994, the European Union (E.U.) challenged U.S. food safety
standards that it anticipates will be adjudged unfair restraints on trade under
the WTO.'4 The European Union wants the United States to eliminate,
among other things:
" The new food labels describing nutritional contents of
groceries that began appearing on shelves in 1994.49
* Limits on lead concentrations in ceramics and wine."5
" The U.S. Delaney Clause"' on carcinogenic pesticides,
establishing an "absolute risk" requirement that prevents the
FDA from approving even negligible levels of carcinogens
on food for sale.15 2
'44 Telephone interview with Gabriela Boyer, Public Citizen (Sept. 8, 1994).
11 NAFTA, supra note 6, at art. 906(2).
4 Gabriela Boyer & Nancy Watzman, GATTastrophe, THE NATION, June 13, 1994, at
821.
147 id
1" Services of the European Commission, Brussels, Report on United States Barriers to
Trade and Investment, 1994 (April 1994) [hereinafter E.C. Report].
1419 Id at 581.
150 Id. at 77.
m Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(cX3)(A), 376(b)(5)(B),
409(c)(3), 706(b)(5)(B) (1988).
152 E.C. Report, supra note 148, at 77.
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0 California's Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement
Act, 15 3 which, among other provisions designed to protect
the public from exposure to toxic chemicals, requires labels
for cancer-causing substances in products for sale.
Finally, the European Union suggests that American federalism itself is a
"structural impediment" to trade because it allows individual states to set
their own health and safety standards." s
NAFTA has shown that free trade and environmental protection are not
incompatible goals within the same international agreement. But untempered
by "green" provisions, the new WTO poses a serious threat to the global
environment because it gives license to developing nations to attract
investment through environmental subsidies.
I. ANALYsis
A. Theory and Critique of the Use of Eco-Tariffs
Vice President Al Gore has suggested that "U]ust as government subsidies
of a particular industry are sometimes considered unfair under the trade laws,
weak and ineffectual enforcement of pollution control measures should also
be included in the definition of unfair trading practices."" 5 The U.S. law
153 Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25180.7, 25189.5, 25192, 25249.5-25249.13 (West
Supp. 1989). Adopted by statewide ballot as Proposition 65 in 1986, the Safe Drinking Water
and Toxic Enforcement Act was approved by 63% of California voters. Paul Jacobs, Inspired
Prop. 65 Authors Take Aim At Air Pollution, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1986, at A3.
154 E.C. Report, supra note 148, at 56.
155 AL GORE, JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE: EcOLoGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 343
(1992). Gore is cautiously supportive of the Uruguay Round. Nonetheless, in April 1994,
he delivered a controversial speech in Marrakesh, Morocco in which he warned of the
environmental danger posed by the WTO:
[N]on-compliance with environmental standards is not an acceptable way
to stimulate growth. We must not damage the regenerative capacity of
our ecosystems in the interests of expanded trade, or sacrifice valuable
biological diversity for short term economic growth.... As the world
moves to resolve environmental problems and strengthen environmental
protection, the corresponding trade implications will have to be discussed
openly in the World Trade Organization, as well as other fora.
Vice President Al Gore, address at the meeting of the GAIT Plenary Committee 5, 6 (April
14, 1994) (transcript available from the White House Press Office).
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regulating unfair trading practices is the Trade Agreements Act of 1979."5
The Act allows the Commerce Department and the International Trade
Commission to label a foreign industry as dumping if the sale of its products
below fair market value threatens to cause material injury to the correspond-
ing domestic industry. 15 7
Legislating an eco-dumping law would turn this old trade practice on its
head. While traditional dumping law is concerned with injury to U.S.
producers,'58 eco-dumping tariffs are principally a response to environmen-
tal degradation in other nations. Admittedly, this raises serious sovereignty
concerns as a "process-based," and not a "product-based" regulation. While
a product-based regulation controls importation of a product dangerous in
itself, a process-based regulation controls a perfectly innocuous product
because of an objection to its method of production. 59 Understanding this
distinction is crucial."6 Pollution havens create a process-based objection.
True, the maquiladoras cause air and water pollution that crosses the U.S.-
Mexican border. But the main concern raised by weak environmental
standards is that such development is unsustainable. Development has
intergenerational implications. When a developing nation fuels short-term
development by employing an eco-subsidy, it is sacrificing long-term
156 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988).
1s7 Id.
'5' Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism:
the Need for a Synthesis With Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 394 (1994).
159 See generally John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies:
Congruence or Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992) (suggesting the tuna/dolphin
case is a prime example of the process-product difficulty); Steve Chamovitz, A Taxonomy of
Environmental Trade Measures, 6 GEo. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 1 (1993) (presenting multiple
examples of process- and product-based regulation).
160 Consider a hypothetical example-the importation of Mexican jumping beans:
Product-based regulation: Suppose that the U.S. Congress acted to prohibit the sale or
importation of Mexican jumping beans cultivated using carcinogenic pesticides prohibited by
U.S. law. This prohibition would raise no free trade concerns because it regulates a safety
and health aspect of the good itself. As long as the United States does not discriminate in
its prohibition (for example, welcoming Canadian jumping beans laden with the same
pesticides), no serious sovereignty question is raised.
Process-based regulation: Instead, imagine that Mexican jumping beans are not hazardous
in any way. However, the vast greenhouses in which the jumping beans are raised create an
extremely toxic effluent which is discharged into a local river. The process used to create
this benign product is repugnant, because it internalizes a cost of production by endangering
the health of downstream residents. The importing country contributes to this industrial
violence by making it profitable.
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development as resources are depleted and fouled, the health of workers and
their children is jeopardized, 6 ' and the attraction of "dirty" industry creates
a cycle of pollution as non-polluting industries' shy away from toxic
communities. 62
Opponents of eco-tariffs (particularly developing nations themselves) call
this "eco-imperialism".62 Any unilateral environmental police action by
a powerful industrialized nation against a developing nation (outside of any
international agreement) is bound to be criticized as hypocritical and
arbitrary. After all, the United States became a mighty industrial power by
exploiting its resources. President Dwight D. Eisenhower spoke with pride
about America's industrial pre-eminence in 1956: "I have seen the smoky
fury of our factories-rising to the skies."'" Yet the United States in the
1950s was largely unaware of the ecological effects of industry. To a great
extent, U.S. environmental law has kept pace with scientific discoveries.
The discovery of a hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica in 1985 resulted
in the signing of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer within two years." s Richard Benedick, the chief U.S. negotiator of
the Montreal Protocol, recounts how the United States sprang into action in
response to the ozone discovery:
The U.S. government set the example by being the first
[nation] to take regulatory action against the suspect chemi-
cals. [It] ... tenaciously campaigned for its international
acceptance [of the Montreal Protocol] through bilateral and
multilateral initiatives. The staff of the U.S. Environmental
163 After a decade of rapid industrialization in maquiladora border communities, greatly
increased rates of rare and fatal birth defects such as anencephaly (brain deformity) are being
reported. Joel Simon, Dirty Work, 13-Feb. CAL. LAW. 40 (1993).
162 The economic principle of "Gresham's law" ("bad money drives out good") is
frequently invoked to describe this phenomenon. When one firm relocates to a pollution
haven to take advantage of an eco-subsidy, its competitors have an incentive to follow suit,
in order to remain competitive. For example, at least eleven Los Angeles wood furniture
manufacturers, facing increased air pollution costs due to their high-volume use of paint and
solvents, followed each other to Mexico between 1988 and 1990. U.S. General Accounting
Office, U.S.-Mexico Trade: Some U.S. Wood Furniture Firms Relocated from Los Angeles
Area to Mexico 3, GAO/NSIAD-91-191, April 1991.
163 Weiss, supra note 17, at 732.
" Seattle address by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Oct. 17, 1956, quoted in E.B.
WHIE, ESSAYS OF E.B. WHrra 93 (1977).
'65 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 106.
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Protection Agency (EPA) labored tirelessly to develop
volumes of analyses on all aspects of the problem .... 16
During the 1980s, as the U.S. automakers General Motors, Ford, and
Chrysler began to lose their global hegemony to foreign imports, the effect
on employment in Michigan, Ohio, and other states was devastating.
67
The United States could have protected those jobs by lowering pollution
standards for the auto industry."a That it did not perhaps suggests that the
nation was conscious that prosperity cannot be artificially maintained at the
cost of the environment. 16
Perhaps more convincingly, developing nations do not currently have
unfettered sovereignty to exploit their resources in an unsustainable way.
NAFTA itself restricts trade development to "a manner consistent with
environmental protection and conservation. ' 70 Consider also the Stock-
holm Declaration on the Human Environment of 1972, which declares
that nations must prevent domestic activities from causing environmental
degradation outside their territory, as well as the less bold but still significant
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
17 1
66 RICHARD ELU OT BENEDICK, Ozone Diplomacy 5-7 (1991).
167 Helen Fogel, GM Cuts Will Cost State 1,000 Additional Jobs, DETROrr NEWS, Oct. 16,
1992, at Al.
36 End of Economic-Environment Conflict to be sought by EPA, Policy Official Says,
NAT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA) (Dec. 3, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
'
6 This forbearance has paid off. 1994 has been a record-breaking year for Detroit. This
success was won by producing better cars, not by internalizing environmental costs.
0 NAFTA, supra note 6, preamble.
n Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Principle 21, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1, at 3-5 (1972), reprinted
in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. The Stockholm Declaration,
while nonbinding, articulated the imperative of sustainability far more boldly than any current
international agreement: "All countries agree that uniform environmental standards should
not be expected to be applied universally by all countries with respect to given industrial
processes or products except in those cases where environmental disruption may constitute
a concern to other countries." Id. at Recommendation 103(e) (emphasis added).
I72 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev. 1, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. "Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation." Id at princ. 15.
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The WTO must not be allowed to commence its work without added
environmental protections. Yet, the concerns of third-world nations for their
sovereignty are valid. Opposition will block any environmental reform of
the WTO unless those nations' concerns are adequately addressed. As the
NRDC's Justin Ward suggests, "It is clear that the developing nations are
viscerally opposed because they see it as a sneaky attempt to keep them in
poverty by using environmental standards." '73 Both the sovereignty issue
and environmental concerns must be at the heart of any proposal for a "green
round" of GATT negotiations.
B. Reforming the WTO to Allow Imposition of Eco-Tariffs
It is unknown what priorities the new Republican majority in Congress
hold towards the WTO. The support of incoming House Speaker Newt
Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole were crucial to ratification
of the Uruguay Round. Moreover, many Republican members of Congress
are hostile towards environmental restraints on trade. The new Majority,
however, should take a close look at legislation proposed by former House
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt. Gephardt has proposed "Blue and Green
301" legislation ("Blue" for blue-collar labor and "Green" for the environ-
ment) modeled on Section 301 of the U.S. trade law 174 to "allow a stronger
U.S. response to inadequate pollution control.' ' 75 The present Section 301
has been used to impose sanctions against foreign markets perceived by the
United States as being unfairly protectionistic. A "Blue and Green 301"
would recognize that environmental and labor subsidies are unacceptable
trade practices, even though process-based. It would recognize the great
power of the U.S. market to leverage social change around the world.
Like a sledgehammer, though, a market is a blunt tool to create change.
Unilateral action by the United States against third world nations seems
inherently paternalistic. This perception will create even more North-South
resentment, a prospect which dampens any hope for sustainable global
173 Ward interview, supra note 13.
174 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2487 (1988
& Supp. 1990). Feared by other countries, Section 301 empowers the United States Trade
Representative to impose crushing tariffs on countries in violation of "fair" trade practices.
Id
175 Rep. Richard A. Gephardt, Address at the Economic Strategy Institute 7 (May 11,
1993) (transcript available from the Office of the Majority Leader).
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economic growth. Further, the U.S. Senate is likely to act in a markedly
more isolationist manner under Republican control. Passage of "Blue and
Green 301" is now very unlikely.
The solution will not come from Congress. A multilateral forum is
required to impose eco-tariffs on products manufactured under an environ-
mental subsidy. This forum need not be created from scratch, because an
appropriate organization is about to be born: the WTO itself. There is no
reason that the WTO must be a counter-environmental organization. Three
specific changes would make this powerful new organization into a vehicle
for sustainable global trade and environmental protection:
1. Amend the GATT subsidy code, defining eco-dumping as an
unfair trading practice.
2. Eliminate the confidentiality provisions of the dispute
resolution procedures. This will create a climate of moral
accountability for votes cast on eco-dumping complaints.
3. Adopt an environmental standards chapter similar to
NAFTA's. 76 This will prohibit downward harmonization
of environmental standards, and will slowly ratchet up
standards in developing nations as their economies grow as
a result of the freer trade.
It seems unlikely that the new Republican majority in Congress will have
any desire to reform the WTO to address concerns of global environmental
sustainability. Yet, the desperate conditions along the U.S.-Mexico border
should be horrifying enough to convince even the most ardent free trader of
the necessity of preventing pollution havens.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the earliest example of industrial land-use planning, the Bible recounts
that when Adam was granted the Garden of Eden, he was commanded "to
work it and take care of it."" This ancient notion of development
tempered with stewardship lies at the heart of NAFTA: it is a strong
framework for free trade, imbued with an strong environmental ethic. This
ethic is repudiated by the WTO, which subscribes to a philosophy of
376 See NAFTA, supra note 6, at ch. 9.
'7 Genesis 2:15.
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development at any cost. Unsustainable development is unconscionable in
a generation that has seen the horrors wreaked by untempered industrial-
ization: Chernobyl,17 1 the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 9 the chemical tragedy
at Bhopal,"W and increasingly, the U.S.-Mexico border area. The WTO
will inevitably spur the creation of more pollution havens unless sustain-
ability provisions such as multilaterally imposed eco-tariffs are adopted. It
requires supermajority voting by all WTO members to amend WTO
rules. ' It will thus require a strong showing of diplomatic resolve to
convince the world community to allow eco-tariffs. The consequences for
failure to do so, however, are very grave indeed. The WTO is a new
organization, and cannot yet use "but we've always done it this way.. ." as
an excuse to resist change. The best opportunity to act is now.
Joel L Silverman
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